Let [(R ec , R uc ), (R ev , R uv )] represent an ownership structure where R ec represents the client's excludability rights, R uc represents the client's usability rights, R ev represents the vendor's excludability rights, and R uv represents the vendor's usability rights. Because of the diagonal symmetry only the bottom left diagonal will be discussed in detail.
Proof of Propositions

[(E,U), (E,U)]
Proposition 1: If U c is primarily sensitive to i c , U v is primarily sensitive to i v , S depends equally on i c and i v , then [(E,U) , (E,U)] ownership is the second best (i.e., it is at least as good as any other ownership structure, but fails to be optimal).
Under these assumptions, the first order conditions for the optimal investments become (4) do not correspond to the first order conditions for [(E,U) , (E,U)] in the table above, this ownership structure result is not optimal. Therefore, to show that it is second best, it is necessary to establish that it is superior to all other ownership structures.
First, compare the client's investment under [(E,N) , (E,U)] to the client's investment under [(E,U) , (E,U)]. , which is also negative. Therefore, increasing the value at which g(i c ) is evaluated by the positive amount ½MU c /Mi c decreases the level of investment that the client will make under [(E,N) , (E,U)] as compared to [(E,U) , (E,U)].
FOC [(E,U), (E,
Next, compare the investments of the vendor under the two ownership structures. From the first order conditions for [(E,U) , (E,U)], a function g v (i v ) can be constructed analogous to the g c (i c ) in (5). In this case the analogous equation for [(E,N) , (E,U)] is FOC [(E,N) , (E,U)]: As ε approaches zero the later term vanishes and the first order conditions for [(E,N) , (E,U)] and [(E,U), (E,U)] are the same and the level of investment each generates is the same.
This shows that the level of investment of the client is lower under [(E,N) , (E,U)] than [(E,U), (E,U)] and the investment of the vendor is unchanged. However, it remains to be seen that this generates less value. To prove that it is sufficient to show that [(E,U), (E,U)] generates less investment than the first best. Then, because value is increasing in investment, [(E,U) , (E,U)] will generate more value than [(E,N) , (E,U)].
It is clear that functions h c (i c ) and h v (i v ) can be constructed from (3) and (4) analogous to g c (i c ) and g v (i v ) above, but describing the investment decision under the first best condition. One can then construct the first order conditions for [(E,U), (E,U)] as Applying the logic above one more time shows that [(E,U), (E,U)] generates less investment than is optimal. Moreover, [(E,N) , (E,U)] generates less investment than [(E,U), (E,U)] and hence is further from optimal. Therefore, [(E,U) , (E,U)] is second best when compared to [(E,N) , (E,U)]. Now it must be shown that the same holds for the other ownership choices. Next, compare [(E,U) , (E,U)] to [(N,U), (E,U)]. It is clear that the client's investment is lower. This can be shown by repeating the same procedure as was used above. However, the vendor's investment is higher, again by the same logic. Therefore, it is necessary to show that increase in value created by the increase the vendor's investment is less than the absolute value of the decrease due to the client's decreased investment. To do this, first rewrite the first order conditions as 
It is clear that functions analogous to g c (i c ) above can be constructed for both client and vendor. Applying the same logic as above, is it immediately obvious that the investment of both client and vendor will be lower and hence the joint profit will be lower.
Type [(E,U), (E,U)] ownership is superior to all other candidate ownership structures given the conditions of the proposition. Therefore, [(E,U), (E,U)] is second best, under the conditions of this proposition. Finally, the logic of (5) and (6) can be applied to show that [(E,N) , (E,U)] generates more joint surplus than [(E,N) , (E,N)]. It must first be noted that, by assumption, MU v /Mi c = gf(i c ). This implies that, in the limit, the client's first order conditions are not changed. However, the vendor is offered strictly less incentive to invest. Therefore, [(E,N) , (E,U)] generates more joint surplus than [(E,N) , (E,N)].
Under the assumptions of this section type [(E,N) , (E,U)] ownership is superior to all other alternative ownership structures. Hence, under these assumptions type [(E,N) , (E,U)] ownership is second best.
Proposition 3:
If U c is primarily sensitive to i c , and both U v and S are primarily sensitive to i v then [(E,N) , (E,U)] ownership is the second best. This is easily shown by noting that the first order conditions for first best under these assumptions are None of the other first order conditions offers the same levels of investment. Therefore, by choosing g arbitrarily small, the investment levels for type [(N,U), (E,U)] ownership can be made arbitrarily closer to first best than any other ownership structure under the assumptions of this section. To see this first note that under these assumptions Following the logic of (5) and (6), all other ownership structures offer the vendor strictly less incentive to invest. Therefore, the vendor invests more and the client invests no less under type [(N,N) , (E,U)] ownership than any other ownership structure, but less than the optimal level of investment. Hence, type [(N,N) , (E,U)] ownership generates more joint surplus than any other ownership structure, making it second best.
Proposition 5:
If the value from all sources depends equally on i c and i v , the return to i c with respect to U c falls off more rapidly than the return to i v with respect to U c , the return to i v with respect to U v falls off more rapidly than the return to i c with respect to U v , then [(E,N) , (E,N)] ownership is the second best. (33) is strictly positive. Thus, MBMx is strictly negative. This means that the integral is strictly negative, which means that the profit at x = 1 is less than the profit at x = ½. Therefore, [(E,N) , (E,N)] is better than [(E,U), (E,U)].
Next, compare to [(E,N) , (E,U)], by writing the first order conditions as FOC client: 
The coefficients x, y, and z are between zero and one depending on the ownership structure. However, in the presence of cannibalization, the vendor's actual investment solves 
By assumption, all the terms to the right of the inequality are positive, and the only restriction on * is * > 0. This implies that there exists some * for which the solution to (51) is greater the solution to (50). Thus, there is a possibility of vendor overinvestment in the presence of cannibalization. To show this the minimum * needed to satisfy (52) need to be compared for each ownership structure.
These solutions are detailed below. It is also clear that * 5 > * 2 because they have the same denominator and * 5 has a larger numerator.
Likewise, * 1 > * 3 because they have the same denominator and * 5 has a larger numerator. Given that MU c /Mi v is large * 3 > * 5 because the numerator of * 3 can be made large faster than the numerator of * 
